There’s not a lot new to report about these businesses - and that’s good, not bad. Severe change and exceptional returns usually don’t mix. Most investors, of course, behave as if just the opposite were true. That is, they usually confer the highest price-earnings ratios on exotic-sounding businesses that hold out the promise of feverish change. That prospect lets investors fantasize about future profitability rather than face today’s business realities. For such investor-dreamers, any blind date is preferable to one with the girl next door, no matter how desirable she may be.

今年關於我們旗下企業沒啥新東西可以講，這是好事。劇烈的變動和卓越的報酬通常是不會湊在一塊兒的。但大多數的投資人想的正好相反，總是將高本益比的投資放在那種抱著不切實際的承諾、聽起來淨是奇異的公司。就是這種設想讓投資人們寧可做著夢想未來有高獲利的白日夢，也不肯面對今日公司現實狀況。對這種「做夢型投資人」來說，任何一場盲目相親都比鄰家女孩來的有吸引力，不管後者實際上有多麼性感。

Experience, however, indicates that the best business returns are usually achieved by companies that are doing something quite similar today to what they were doing five or ten years ago. That is no argument for managerial complacency. Businesses always have opportunities to improve service, product lines, manufacturing techniques, and the like, and obviously these opportunities should be seized. But a business that constantly encounters major change also encounters many chances for major error. Furthermore, economic terrain that is forever shifting violently is ground on which it is difficult to build a fortress-like business franchise. Such a franchise is usually the key to sustained high returns.

經驗顯示，真正優秀的企業其獲利方式通常5或10年來沒啥不同，當然經營階層不可因此自滿，企業總是有無數可以改進的地方，諸如服務、產品線、生產技術和其他，且這些可改進之處也都該好好看緊；但企業老是在搞重大改變的，往往也會搞出重大錯誤。更進一步來說，商業之域本來就是一片變動激烈地土地，要在上面蓋一個固若金湯的堡壘本非易事，但能找到穩定獲利模式的企業卻是維持高報酬的關鍵。

The Fortune study I mentioned earlier supports our view. Only 25 of the 1,000 companies met two tests of economic excellence - an average return on equity of over 20% in the ten years, 1977 through 1986, and no year worse than 15%. These business superstars were also stock market superstars: During the decade, 24 of the 25 outperformed the S&P 500.

財星雜誌的研究就支持我的觀點：1千家企業中只有25家能夠在1977到1986年間維持10年平均ROE 20%以上，且沒有任何一年低於15%的成績。這些商業超級巨星也是股市裡的巨星，在這十年間，有24家表現遠遠打敗標準普爾500。

The Fortune champs may surprise you in two respects. First, most use very little leverage compared to their interest-paying capacity. Really good businesses usually don’t need to borrow. Second, except for one company that is “high-tech” and several others that manufacture ethical drugs, the companies are in businesses that, on balance, seem rather mundane. Most sell non- sexy products or services in much the same manner as they did ten years ago (though in larger quantities now, or at higher prices, or both). The record of these 25 companies confirms that making the most of an already strong business franchise, or concentrating on a single winning business theme, is what usually produces exceptional economics.

這些財星雜誌裡的贏家可能在兩方面都讓你大開眼界：首先，多數公司相對其付息能力，幾乎不太用財務槓桿；因為真正優秀的企業通常不需要借錢。再者，除了僅有一家高科技公司，和幾家製藥公司入榜之外，多數都是單調平凡的企業。他們所銷售的服務或商品一點都不性感，根本就跟10年前做的沒啥不同（除了賣更多或賣更貴，或兩者都有）。這25家公司的紀錄顯示，充分運用既有的商業優勢或聚焦在單一領先事業就能創造優異的經濟表現。

Berkshire’s experience has been similar. Our managers have produced extraordinary results by doing rather ordinary things - but doing them exceptionally well. Our managers protect their franchises, they control costs, they search for new products and markets that build on their existing strengths and they don’t get diverted. They work exceptionally hard at the details of their businesses, and it shows.

Berkshire自己的經驗也是這樣：我們的經理人就是靠著「做平凡事但做到最好」的方式，創造出不凡成績。他們一方面維繫著既有優勢地位、控制成本，一方面在既有基礎上尋找新產品與新市場，且絕不分心，同時鞠躬盡粹地專心搞定事業中最細節之處，自然成績能「金光閃閃」！

∼取自【1987 巴菲特給股東的信】

其實巴菲特的觀點，跟Jim Collins花了5年時間、1萬5千小時研究而成的【A到A+（Good to Great）】一書的結論不謀而合。

該書認為：多數企管書或商學言論都滿是英雄崇拜、科技怪癖或高速成長、敗部復活等戲劇化傳奇，但事實上這種天方夜譚發生頻率其實很低，也不值得羨慕，其成功經驗更是難以複製。

充滿魅力的領袖雖然很好，但往往也會是公司的負債。

堅持把事情做好，堅守簡單的原則，一步一步從爬、走成長到跑，仍是成功企業的唯一經營之道。

這本書相當建議各位網友找來讀讀，我已經在這裡推薦不下數次了，這次依然不嫌贅言。